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In recent years, the world has witnessed the emergence of violent extremists (VEs), and they have become an ongoing 
concern for countries around the globe. A great deal of effort has been expended examining their nature and structure in 
order to aid in the development of interventions to prevent further violence. Analysts and scholars have been particularly 
interested in identifying structural features that enhance (or diminish) VE resilience to exogenous and endogenous 
shocks. As many have noted, VEs typically seek to balance operational security and capacity/efficiency. Some argue that 
their desire for secrecy outweighs their desire for efficiency, which leads them to be less centralized with few internal 
connections. Others argue that centralization is necessary because security is more easily compromised and that internal 
density promotes solidarity and limits countervailing influences. Unsurprisingly, scholars have found evidence for both 
positions. In this paper, we analyze the Noordin Top terrorist network over time to examine the security-efficiency 
tradeoff from a new perspective. We find that the process by which they adopt various network structures is far more 
complex than much of the current literature suggests. The results of this analysis highlight implications for devising 
strategic options to monitor and disrupt dark networks. 
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Violent extremist networks (aka covert networks, 
dark networks) are an ongoing concern for countries 
around the globe. Their nature and structure have 
been examined for the purpose of developing 
interventions that destabilize, disrupt, or otherwise 
prevent further violence. Identifying structural 
features that enhance (or diminish) their resilience to 
exogenous and endogenous shocks is of particular 
interest. As many have noted, groups generally seek 
to balance operational security and 
capacity/efficiency (see e.g., Combatting Terrorism 
Center, 2006; Crossley, Edwards, Harries, & 
Stevenson, 2012; McCormick & Owen, 2000; 
Morselli, Giguère, & Petit, 2007). A consensus, 
however, has not been reached as to which features 
enhance the ability of dark networks to maintain such 
a balance. For example, existing literature offers two 
somewhat conflicting hypotheses about the 
relationship between network structure and 
operational security. Some argue that when the desire 
for secrecy outweighs the desire for efficiency, dark 
networks tend to be internally sparse and 
decentralized (Baker & Faulkner, 1993; Enders & Su, 
2007; Raab & Milward, 2003). Others argue just the 
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opposite: the desire for secrecy leads dark networks 
toward high levels of centralization and density. 
Centralization is necessary because security can be 
compromised when transactions have to traverse long 
paths, and this can be overcome when a central hub 
coordinates activity (Lindelauf, Borm, & Hamers, 
2009). They also contend that density is the norm 
among dark networks because it promotes solidarity 
and limits countervailing influences (Coleman, 
1988), as well as the fact that they recruit primarily 
along lines of trust (Erickson, 1981). 
Evidence has been found for several points of 
view regarding the security-efficiency tradeoff 
(Crossley et al., 2012; Everton & Cunningham, 
2013). One reason is because how one measures 
centralization and density profoundly affects one’s 
results and conclusions (Crossley et al., 2012). For 
example, centralization is often based on degree 
centrality (Freeman, 1979), but it is unclear whether 
this best captures the type of centralization found in 
dark networks. Measurement problems exist in terms 
of density as well. For example, because the standard 
density measure is inversely associated with network 
size, large and geographically dispersed networks 
will typically exhibit lower levels of density. A 
second factor contributing to the opposing views 
regarding the security-efficiency tradeoff is that most 
studies have not fully accounted for the multi-
relational nature of dark networks (Crossley et al., 
2012) or have failed to outline the types of 
relationships under examination (Lindelauf et al., 
2009). Most have focused on a single type of relation, 
usually communication ties, but dark network actors 
are embedded in a range of relationships. A final 
reason is that a majority of studies do not account for 
the environment in which these covert networks 
operate. Covert networks are hardly static. They not 
only change in response to their own operational 
goals but also to the strategic choices of their 
opponents. 
In this paper we consider how the structure of 
dark networks can vary in response to both its own 
goals and the strategies adopted by authorities. It 
proceeds as follows. We begin by examining the 
strategic tradeoffs that terrorists and other insurgent 
groups face. These groups generally seek (or at least 
should seek) to balance operational efficiency and 
security, which we operationalize in terms of network 
centralization and interconnectedness, respectively. 
This leads to a series of hypotheses as to what we 
might expect as we observe a dark network over 
time. Next, we turn to this paper’s empirical setting: 
namely, terrorism and insurgency in Indonesia and 
the strategic approaches adopted by the Indonesian 
authorities in their attempts to combat these dark 
networks. We then discuss the data and methods used 
in our analysis. We then present the results, which 
show that the process by which dark networks adopt 
various network structures is far more complex than 
much of the current literature suggests. We conclude 
by discussing various limitations of our study and 




Operational efficiency is largely affected by the 
ability of insurgencies to mobilize people and 
resources (McCormick, 2005; McCormick & Owen, 
2000). Some scholars suggest centralized networks 
are positively associated with operational efficiency 
(Baker & Faulkner, 1993; Morselli, 2009) and are 
more effective in mobilizing people and resources 
because they facilitate an efficient decision-making 
process (Enders & Jindapon, 2010), which enhances 
strategic planning and creates accountability and 
standards among network members (Tucker, 2008). 
They can also facilitate the transfer of resources due 
to shorter path lengths between leaders and other 
network actors (Lindelauf et al., 2009). Thus, it is not 
surprising that several relatively successful dark 
networks have been considered centralized networks 
built around charismatic leaders.  Enders and Sandler 
(2006), for example, suggest that the centralized 
nature of Aum Shinrikyo in the 1990s facilitated its 
ability to successfully launch a sarin gas attack on the 
Tokyo subway, while the decentralized structure of 
Al Qaeda has reduced its ability to attain and launch 
a CBRN attack.1 To be sure, many of these 
characterizations have been largely qualitative in 
nature and lack standard social network analysis 
measures.2 Nevertheless, they do suggest that 
centralization is often positively associated with the 
command and control of dark networks. 
Centralization can be a mixed blessing, however. 
Research suggests that less centralized organizations 
are able to adapt more quickly to rapidly changing 
environments (Arquilla, 2009) and are less vulnerable 
to the removal of key members (Bakker, Raab, & 
Milward, 2011; Sageman, 2003, 2004). Many dark 
networks, in particular terrorist networks, are often 
assumed to adopt cellular and distributed forms of 
network structure (Carley, Dombroski, Tsvetovat, 
Reminga, & Kamneva, 2003). This allows small cells 
to operate relatively independently with lower 
operational costs, which in turn allows them to more 
easily adjust to a rapidly changing environment than 
can hierarchically-structured networks (Kenney, 
2007). Moreover, less centralized networks are more 
likely to withstand shocks, such as the capture of a 
key member, because much of the remaining network 
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goes untouched and is capable of continuing 
operations. However, dark networks that are too 
decentralized may find it difficult to mobilize 
resources. Moreover, they run the risk of having 
individuals or small cells go “rogue” and conduct 
operations not aligned with their operational interests. 
This suggests that an optimal level of centralization 
exists for covert networks and it is likely to change 
over time. One could argue that dark networks will 
shift toward the centralized-side of the continuum 
when mobilization and the transfer of resources is its 
primary focus (e.g., just prior to an attack). On the 
other hand, they are more likely to decentralize when 
adaptability takes precedence, such as in the 
aftermath of an operation. In addition, network 
centralization is almost certainly a function of 
environmental context (Everton, 2012b). In relatively 
friendly environments where adaptability is less 
crucial and the risk for losing key actors is low, 
covert networks will probably be more centralized. 
However, if the environment becomes more hostile, 
they will move toward the decentralized end of the 
spectrum. For example, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that prior to 9/11 al Qaeda was somewhat centralized, 
but after it came under attack from coalition forces, it 
adopted a much more decentralized organizational 
structure (Sageman, 2008). In any case, these factors 
suggest that cross sectional analyses are ill equipped 




There is little debate that groups recruit primarily 
through their social ties. For instance, Lofland and 
Stark’s (1965; see also, Stark, 1996) study of 
conversion to the Unification Church discovered that 
those who ultimately joined tended to be those whose 
ties to group members exceeded their ties to 
nonmembers. Similarly, Stark and Bainbridge (1980) 
found that while the door-to-door efforts of Mormon 
missionaries were relatively unsuccessful, when 
missionaries met non-Mormons in the homes of 
Mormon friends, they enjoyed a success rate close to 
50 percent. Why? Because such meetings occurred 
only after lay Mormons had built close personal ties 
with these non-Mormons and essentially brought 
them into their networks. A meta-analysis by Snow 
and his colleagues (Snow, Zurcher, & Ekland-Olson, 
1980) and McAdam’s (1986; see also, McAdam & 
Paulsen, 1993) examination of the 1964 Freedom 
Summer campaign uncovered a similar dynamic: 
Successful social movements recruit primarily 
through their social ties (Snow et al., 1980, p.791). 
And finally, Sageman’s (2003, 2004) analysis of the 
global Salafi jihad (GSJ) discovered that 83% of 
members were recruited through friendship, kinship, 
or mentorship ties. 
Because security is of primary concern for dark 
networks, they tend to recruit along lines of trust 
(Passy, 2003). Not doing so can be dangerous, as 
Ramzi Yousef, one of the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombers, learned the hard way. As long as he 
recruited through strong ties, he successfully evaded 
the authorities, but when he enlisted an unfamiliar 
South African student, his luck ran out. After Yousef 
asked the student to take a suspicious package to a 
Shiite mosque, the student called the U.S. embassy, 
which led to Yousef’s arrest and later extradition to 
the U.S (Sageman, 2004, p.109-110). Recruitment 
through strong ties suggests that the networks will 
become increasingly dense over time as ties form 
between previously unlinked actors. This is due to the 
phenomenon that Granovetter (1973) referred to as 
the “forbidden triad” that eventually leads to an 
increase in group density (Figure 1).  
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Dense networks consisting of numerous strong 
ties bring an important benefit to dark networks: 
They minimize defection because they are better able 
to monitor behavior (Finke & Stark, 1992, 2005; 
Granovetter, 2005), appropriate solidary incentives 
(McAdam, 1982, 1999; Smith, 1991), and solve 
coordination problems (Chwe, 2001). Dark networks 
that minimize defection are generally more 
successful than those that do not. In fact, they often 
“prefer” having members killed over having them 
defect because “if one activist decides to defect, the 
whole organization is vulnerable to the defector’s 
subsequent actions” (Hafez, 2004, p. 40), and they 
typically have to alter their plans and lie low for an 
unspecified amount of time (Berman, 2009, p. 29). 
Security concerns not only lead members of dark 
networks to recruit primarily through strong ties, but 
they also lead them to limit their ties with outsiders 
because it helps minimize the presence of ideas and 
other countervailing influences that could challenge a 
group’s worldview. However, while limiting external 
ties can improve a group’s security, dark networks 
that are entirely isolated from the outside world are 
unlikely to sustain their movement over the long term 
(Jackson, Petersen, Bull, Monsen, & Richmond, 
1960) because they need links to other groups in 
order to gain access to important information and 
other material and nonmaterial resources (e.g., 
weapons, materials, new recruits). As others have 
noted, external ties are vital for any group or 
organization attempting to survive in a rapidly 
changing environment (Uzzi, 1996, 2008; Uzzi & 
Spiro, 2005), and this is simply more acute for 
insurgent groups because they face not only a 
constantly shifting environment, but one that is 
hostile at that. 
Hypotheses 
Because dark networks seek to maintain an 
optimal level of centralization as well as balance 
between internal and external ties, we should expect 
such levels to vary in light of operational goals and 
events on the ground. Of course, some changes in 
network structure occur not by design but 
unwittingly. An important insight of social network 
theory is that the individual choices that actors make 
(e.g., forming or dissolving a tie) can sometimes 
cause changes in network structure of which they did 
not intend or are even aware (Maoz, 2011). 
Nevertheless, as noted above, we expect dark 
networks to move toward the centralized-side of the 
continuum when mobilization of resources is the 
group’s primary focus, such as just prior to an attack, 
but are likely to decentralize when adaptability and 
flexibility take precedence, such as in the aftermath 
of an operation. This can be stated more formally as 
follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Because of the need to mobilize 
resources for an operation, dark networks will 
become more centralized just prior to an attack. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Because of a need to be 
adaptable after an operation, dark networks will 
seek to become less centralized after an attack. 
 
Pre- and post-operation considerations may also 
affect their relative number of external ties. In 
particular, just prior to an operation, they may 
increase the number of their external ties, while after 
an operation, they may seek to sever them: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Because dark networks often 
need to access external resources in order to 
carry out operations, they will increase the 
relative number of their external ties prior to an 
attack. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Because immediately after an 
operation dark networks have less need to access 
to resources, they will decrease the relative 
number of their external ties shortly after an 
attack. 
 
However, a dark network’s relative number of 
external ties and centralization level will not only 
adapt in order to meet its operational goals, but it will 
also adapt to its external environment, in particular 
the efforts of authorities to disrupt it. 
Counterinsurgents have a wide variety of strategies at 
their disposal for disrupting dark networks. Roberts 
and Everton (2011) have outlined a variety of 
strategic options available to those seeking to disrupt 
insurgencies and other types of dark networks. They 
divide strategies into two broad types: kinetic and 
non-kinetic. Kinetic strategies involve aggressive and 
offensive measures that seek to eliminate or capture 
network members and their supporters, while non-
kinetic strategic approaches are more holistic and use 
a variety of non-coercive means, such as institution 
building, psychological operations (PsyOps), 
rehabilitation and reintegration programs, 
information operations (IO), and the tracking and 
monitoring of key network members (Everton, 
2012a), in order to sever the ties between the local 
population and the insurgency, ultimately draining it 
of its material and nonmaterial resources. For 
different reasons we expect that (successful) kinetic 
and non-kinetic approaches lead dark networks to 
become increasingly isolated. Kinetic approaches 
accomplish this by causing the environment in which 
 DARK NETWORK RESILIENCE IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT 5 
Criminology, Criminal Justice, Law & Society – Volume 16, Issue 1 
dark networks operate to become more hostile, while 
non-kinetic approaches do so by cutting dark 
networks off from the local population: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Because kinetic operations 
create a hostile environment, dark networks will 
become increasingly isolated in response to 
kinetic operations. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Because non-kinetic operations 
seek to sever ties between dark networks and the 
local population, dark networks will become 
increasingly isolated in response to non-kinetic 
operations. 
 
It is less clear what effect kinetic and non-kinetic 
operations will have on the centralization level of 
dark networks, so at this time we offer no hypotheses 
regarding the effectiveness of each strategy, nor is it 
clear what is desirable. On the one hand, causing dark 
networks to become increasingly centralized may 
allow them to mobilize resources, but at the same 
time it will increase their vulnerability to targeted 
attacks. On the other, causing dark networks to 
become less centralized may diminish their ability to 
carry out attacks, but at the same time, it will make 
them more difficult to monitor and disrupt. We now 
turn to a brief overview of Indonesian militancy, 
which serves as the empirical setting for testing these 
hypotheses. 
 
Empirical Setting: Indonesia 
 
In the early 1950s, a series of rebellions against 
the newly independent Indonesian state began in 
several parts of the country (Conboy, 2006, p. 5). The 
establishment of an Islamic state, along with other 
motivations such as socio-economic reform, brought 
many of these rebellions together under the 
movement known as Darul Islam (DI), which was led 
by Soekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo until his 
capture in 1962. The movement subsequently faced 
many challenges through the 1960s, such as 
numerous defections, a leadership vacuum, and 
contentious debates regarding strategy, all of which 
inspired several efforts to reestablish a more cohesive 
movement in the 1970s and in the 1980s. The most 
well-known product of these efforts, Komando Jihad 
(KJ), consisted of several members of the old DI-
guard; it aimed to re-launch a revolution against the 
state despite its complicated relationship with the 
newly established Suharto regime (Conboy, 2006).  
DI’s influence and its early offshoots on today’s 
militant groups in Indonesia cannot be understated. 
Almost every jihadist organization in the country 
since the 1950s has its roots in DI, including the 
majority of groups active over the last decade, such 
as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Noordin Top’s network. 
Its influence, according to the International Crisis 
Group’s Sidney Jones (2009), stems from a host of 
factors, such as personal and kinship relations that 
stretch across generations and are deeply embedded 
in militant circles today, its employment of tactics 
such as the use of Fa’i,3 its strategy of developing a 
secure area of operation from which it could fight the 
state,4 and its leadership and involvement in conflicts, 
such as the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989), the 
communal conflict in Ambon and Poso, and the 
conflict on the island of Mindanao in the southern 
Philippines, which helped establish ties among 
militant organizations within Indonesia and across 
the region. 
The group from the DI-genealogy receiving the 
most attention since September 11th has been JI. 
Originally formed as a breakaway faction of DI, it 
has its roots in the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The 
organization’s founders, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir, were prominent members of DI and 
among the first to send Indonesian fighters to Camp 
Sadda in Pakistan around 1985, where many future JI 
leaders learned skills they would eventually bring 
back with them. The organization, which was 
formally established in 1993, initially aimed to create 
an Indonesian Islamic state, a goal that was 
eventually expanded into the establishment of a 
regional caliphate. JI grew increasingly violent 
through its support and participation in Indonesian 
communal conflicts in late-1990s and early-2000s. It 
is best known for the October 2002 Bali bombings 
that resulted in 202 deaths and attracted headlines 
across the globe. Indonesian authorities severely 
cracked down on JI in the aftermath of the bombings 
and many of its key leaders were detained or killed.  
All this appears to have created a leadership 
vacuum into which Noordin Mohammed Top 
stepped. A member of JI, Noordin began to sever his 
ties from JI in 2003 after he acquired explosives 
leftover from the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings 
(Everton & Cunningham, 2012). Along with a core 
set of JI members, he used his newly acquired 
resources for his nascent network’s first operation: 
the 2003 JW Marriott attack. For the next two years 
his network, which would go by several names, 
launched several successful attacks against “Western 
targets” in Indonesia. He drew from a deeply 
embedded network of actors, many of whom were DI 
members or members of its offshoots, in order to 
continue operating in the face of increased counter-
terrorism operations. His success eventually landed 
him on the FBI’s Seeking Information-War on 
Terrorism List in 2006. After a three-year lull in 
attacks, he and his associates carried out 
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simultaneous bombings against the Ritz-Carlton and 
Marriott hotels in August 2009. These bombings led 
to further stepped-up police operations and his 
subsequent demise in the following month. Not long 
after Noordin and a few of his key associates were 
killed, his network essentially disintegrated (Everton 
& Cunningham, 2013). 
Noordin’s death should not be seen as an 
absence of a terrorist threat in Indonesia. In 2010, for 
example, a group of jihadists unsuccessfully tried to 
establish a safe haven in Aceh to launch attacks and 
to establish an Islamic state in the country 
(International Crisis Group, 2010). Moreover, a 
group established by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in 2008, 
Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), has joined JI as a 
powerhouse organization in Indonesia. In fact, many 
JI members and former Noordin associates joined 
JAT after its creation. The organization seeks the 
establishment of an Islamic state and largely operates 
above-ground; however, several of its members were 
implicated for participating in Noordin’s 2009 attack, 
for providing recruits for small-scale operations in 
the country, and for being directly involved in the 
2010 Aceh project. Finally, it appears smaller groups 
of less experienced actors, often with the support of 
JI and JAT, have emerged as a serious terrorist threat 
in Indonesia although they have largely focused on 
carrying out local attacks against law enforcement 
(International Crisis Group, 2011). 
Indonesian authorities have responded to the rise 
of Islamic militancy in two primary ways, which 
provide us with something of a natural experiment 
for testing the effect that strategies have on a 
network: One was the formation of Detachment 88 
(Det 88), the Indonesian counter-terrorism squad; the 
other was the establishment of the Jakarta Centre for 
Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), a joint 
initiative between the Indonesian and Australian 
governments. Det 88 was formed in July 2003 shortly 
after the first Bali bombing and is funded, equipped, 
and trained by the United States and Australia. Since 
its inception, it has achieved several notable 
successes, including the arrest or killing of hundreds 
of terrorist suspects, including Azhari Husin, Noordin 
Top’s close associate and primary bomb-maker, and 
Noordin Top himself in late-2009. However, Det 88’s 
tactics have increasingly come under attack from 
several influential Indonesian and international 
organizations for purportedly adopting a “shoot first” 
mentality and for possible human rights violations, 
such as the torture of suspected terrorists 
(Priamarizki, 2013; Roberts, 2013; “Elite Indonesian 
Police Unit,” 2013). The elite squad has reportedly 
killed 50 terrorism suspects since 2010, which has 
only further contributed to domestic and international 
skepticism regarding their rules of engagement. 
Indeed, it appears that Det 88 may have adopted the 
coercive practices of earlier Indonesian 
counterinsurgency efforts by the military, which were 
successful against DI in the 1950s but were 
misapplied in later counterinsurgency efforts 
(Kilcullen, 2010). 
Det 88 is in stark contrast with what is taught at 
the JCLEC, which was founded in 2004 and located 
in Semerang, Indonesia, and seeks to be a resource 
for Southeast Asian governments combatting 
transnational crime and terrorism. It provides a forum 
for academics and other experts to examine the 
Southeast Asian situation, as well as allow 
practitioners to keep up to date with the latest 
developments on combatting terrorism and 
transnational crime (Solomon, 2007). To this end, it 
offers a wide-range of training programs, seminars, 
and workshops on topics such as money laundering, 
human trafficking, cyber-crime, computer forensics, 
crisis negotiation, informant handling and 
interviewing techniques, organized crime, and 
Islamic law and politics (Jakarta Centre for Law 
Enforcement Cooperation, 2005-2010). The center 
also works closely with regional law enforcement 
agencies that are looking to enhance their 
enforcement capacity and approach (Ramakrishna, 
2009). In short, it seeks to offer a more holistic 
approach to combatting the Indonesian terrorist 
threat, which is sorely needed in Indonesia 
(International Crisis Group, 2012). 
Data and Methods 
The Noordin Top network serves as the case 
study for exploring the relationships among dark 
network structure, resilience, and counter-terrorism 
strategies over time. His network, arguably more so 
than any other organization operating within 
Indonesia over the last few decades, demonstrated a 
remarkable ability to withstand both endogenous and 
exogenous shocks. We utilized relational data drawn 
from two International Crisis Group (ICG) reports: 
“Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks” 
(2006) and “Indonesia: Noordin Top’s Support Base” 
(2009). We supplement these with open source data 
in order to generate time codes by month from 
January 2001 through December 2010, which allows 
us to account for when actors entered the network 
and if and when individuals were arrested or killed. 
The ICG reports on Noordin contain rich one-mode 
and two-mode data on a variety of relations and 
affiliations (friendship, kinship, meetings, etc.) along 
with significant attribute data (education, group 
membership, physical status, etc.). From these we 
constructed five networks from several subnetworks 
each containing 237 individuals. Specifically, we 
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created a trust network, which is an aggregation of 
one-mode classmate, friendship, kinship, and co-
religious subnetworks.5 We constructed a second 
network, which we call the operational network, 
from four one-mode networks that were derived from 
corresponding two-mode networks, namely logistics, 
meetings, operations, and training events. Our third 
network is a one-mode communication network, 
which captures the pattern of communications 
between Noordin’s network members. The fourth is 
Noordin’s business and finance network, a one-mode 
network that was derived from a two-mode network 
indicating the business and financial affiliations of 
the members of Noordin’s network.6 Finally, we 
created a combined network, which, as its name 
implies, combines the trust, operational, 
communication, and business and finance networks 
in order to obtain an overall picture of Noordin’s 
network. We consider all but the business and finance 
network in the descriptive portion of our analysis 
below,7 but focus only on the combined network for 
the confirmatory analysis portion.8 
In order to analyze these networks 
longitudinally, we assigned time codes to each actor 
in the network that indicated when they entered and 
left Noordin’s combined network. In assigning these 
codes, we assumed that ties between actors were 
constant over time.  That is, if two actors were coded 
as friends at one point in time, we assumed that they 
remained friends throughout their mutual presence in 
the networks.  The one exception to this concerns the 
meetings subnetwork where, building on the work of 
Krebs (2001), we assumed that a meeting tie did not 
form until the meeting took place (unless, of course, a 
tie was previously formed along another relation such 
as friendship or kinship). We recognize the potential 
limitations of these assumptions and how they may 
affect the estimation of the various topographic 
metrics we utilize in this paper. Nevertheless, we 
believe that the approach taken here is reasonable and 
valid. 
Our dependent variables are various measures 
capturing the centralization and connectedness of 
Noordin’s network over time. Social network 
analysis calculates network centralization based on 
variation in actor centrality (Wasserman & Faust, 
1994). More variation yields higher network 
centralization scores; less variation yields lower 
scores. Because the standard centralization score 
(Freeman, 1979) estimates variation by comparing 
each actor’s score to the score of the network’s most 
central actor, the larger the centralization index, the 
more likely it is that a single actor is central 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 176). An alternative 
measure recommended by Coleman (1964), Hoivik 
and Gleditsch (1975), and Snijders (1981) is variance 
of actor centrality scores found in the network. It 
compares each actor’s score to the average score, 
which means that the larger the centralization index, 
the more likely that a group of actors (rather than a 
single actor) are central. A similar measure, standard 
deviation, also uses the average score of all actors but 
is preferable to variance because it returns us to the 
original unit of measure. In our analysis below, we 
use both standard centralization and standard 
deviation scores, both of which can be calculated for 
any measure of centrality. We include two measures 
of centralization in this paper: degree and 
betweenness. Because degree centrality counts the 
number of ties of each individual actor, centralization 
measures based on degree capture the extent to which 
one or a handful of actors possess numerous ties 
while others do not. By contrast, because 
betweenness centrality estimates the extent to which 
actors in a position to control the flow of resources 
through a network, centralization measures based on 
betweenness indicate the level to which one or a 
handful of actors are in a position to broker the flow 
of resources in a network. 
Multiple measures are available for measuring a 
network’s innerconnectedness with density and 
average degree being the most common. As noted 
above, however, the standard density measure is 
problematic because it is inversely associated with 
network size, and while this limitation can be 
corrected by using average degree centrality (de 
Nooy, Mrvar, & Batagelj, 2011; Scott, 2000), if a 
network adopts a cell-like structure, it can be locally 
dense but globally sparse. We sidestep these issues 
by comparing the network’s external connectedness 
with its internal connectedness, using Krackhardt’s 
(1994) E-I Index, which measures the ratio of ties a 
group has to non-group members to group members: 
 
ܧ െ ܫ
ܧ ൅ ܫ 
  (1) 
 
where ܧ equals the number of external ties and ܫ 
equals the number of internal ties. Thus, if a group 
has all external ties, the index equals 1.0; if it has all 
internal ties, the index equals -1.0; and if there are an 
equal number of internal and external ties, the index 
equals 0.0. We expect a dark network’s E-I index to 
be less than those of light networks, all else being 
equal. Indeed, we expect it to always be negative. Of 
course, here we do not compare a dark with a light 
network but instead examine a particular dark 
network over time. Thus, we expect its E-I index to 
become increasingly negative as pressure is brought 
to bear on the network. 
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We include two variables in order to capture the 
various strategies adopted by Indonesian authorities 
during the period under analysis: (1) one that 
measures the formation and continued existence of 
Det 88, and (2) one that measures the formation and 
continued existence of the JCLEC. Although Det 88 
was formed in July 2003, it did not reach its 
operational capacity of 400 members until mid-2005; 
thus, we include a variable that grows at a rate of 16 
members a month, beginning in July of 2003 until 
reaching 400 members in July of 2005. We rescaled 
the variable by dividing it by 100 in order to make 
interpreting the coefficients easier.  The JCLEC was 
established in July 2004, but it took time for it to 
offer courses that attracted large numbers of students. 
Thus, drawing on course attendance data included in 
the JCLEC’s annual reports (Jakarta Centre for Law 
Enforcement Cooperation, 2005-2010), we created a 
variable that reflects the average number of students 
who attended JCLEC courses in the previous six 
months. In other words, although the center was 
established in July of 2004, the six-month moving 
average for that month was zero since no students 
attended a JCLEC course in the previous six months. 
However, because 49 students attended a course in 
July of 2004, the six-month moving average for 
August 2004 equaled 8.167. As we did with the Det 
88 variable, we divided the moving average by 100 in 
order to make the variable’s effects easier to 
interpret. 
Examining network structure over time requires 
the inclusion of variables to account for important 
temporal and event effects. The model includes two 
variables to control for the curvilinear effect that time 
appears to have on the various centralization 
variables (but not the EI Index – see Figures 3 
through 7): we have included both a month and a 
month-squared variable. For the EI index, we only 
included a month variable. Four additional variables 
control for critical events and periods. A dummy 
variable indicates the death of Noordin and his key 
operatives and their subsequent “absence” from the 
network from September 2009 through the end of our 
analysis. An additional dummy variable measures the 
effect of Noordin’s ability to acquire surplus 
explosives from the 2000 Christmas Eve Bombings 
in Indonesia. This explosives variable covers the time 
from which Noordin obtained the explosives in 
December 2002 to the time in which they were used 
for the network’s first attack in August 2003. We also 
have included a series of pre and post-operation 
dummy variables that capture the three-month period 
immediately preceding and following each of the five 
major operations: Bali I, the JW Marriott Hotel 
bombing, the Australian Embassy bombing, Bali II, 
and the Jakarta Hotel bombings. Because Noordin’s 
network was only directly involved in the bombings 
after the first Bali bombing, the pre and post 
operation dummy variables for all but the first Bali 
bombing are combined into one pre-operation 
variable and one post-operation variable, while the 
pre and post operation variables for the first Bali 
bombing are included separately. 
In order to tease out how the Noordin Top 
terrorist network adapted and changed from 2001 to 
2010 in reaction to endogenous and exogenous 
factors, our analysis includes both descriptive 
methods and ordinary least squares (OLS) 
multivariate regression. Because social network 
assumptions differ from those of standard OLS 
approaches, we use bootstrapping methods to 
estimate standard errors, an approach commonly used 
with social network data (Borgatti, Everett, & 
Freeman, 2002; Prell, 2011). 
Results 
Figures 2 through 6 below present graphs of the 
centralization and E-I Index scores for Noordin’s 
alive and free trust, operational, communication, and 
combined networks. Specifically, the figures graph 
the centralization (degree and betweenness), 
normalized standard deviation (degree and 
betweenness), and E-I index for each of the various 
networks. Moving from left to right the vertical dark 
gray lines indicate key points in the life cycle of 
Noordin’s network: the first Bali bombings (October 
2002), the Marriott Hotel bombing (August 2003), 
the Australian Embassy bombing (July 2004), the 
second Bali bombings (October 2005), the Jakarta 
Hotel bombings (July 2009), and the death of 
Noordin and other key operatives (September 2009). 
Comparing the degree centralization (Figure 2) and 
degree standard deviation (Figure 3) scores of the 
network yields some interesting insights. It appears 
that in terms of degree centralization, the network 
grew increasingly centralized early in its existence, 
and then after a slight dip in 2004, remained 
relatively constant, at least up until the point that 
Noordin was killed. This was not the case in terms of 
degree standard deviation, however. It appears there 
is a quick run up in centralization early in the 
network’s career, but then it drops back to where it 
began before climbing slightly in late-2006. The 
network then shifts back to a downward trend until 
around early-2007, recovers slightly, and then 
remains relatively constant until Noordin’s death in 
2009. The comparison of these two sets of graphs 
suggests that while Noordin formed and maintained 
numerous ties to group members, thus driving up 
degree centralization (Figure 2), his inner circle did 
not, which could explain why except for the jump in 
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2004, degree standard deviation remained relatively 
stable over the time period under examination (Figure 
3). The coefficients for the time variable included in 
Table 1 below (“month”) are consistent with these 
results.  In particular, the coefficient for standard 
(i.e., Freeman) degree centralization is positive and 
statistically significant, indicating that after 
controlling for other factors, degree centralization 
increased over time. By contrast, the coefficient for 
standard deviation is negative but statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that after controlling for 
other factors, degree standard deviation remained 
relatively constant from 2001 to 2010. 
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We do not see a similar relationship between 
betweenness centralization (Figure 4) and 
betweenness standard deviation (Figure 5). Here the 
two sets of scores display similar patterns, suggesting 
that both Noordin and his key operatives located 
themselves in brokerage positions within the 
network. The coefficients for the time variable 
included in Table 1 below are consistent with these 
results as well. The coefficients for both betweenness 
centralization and betweenness standard deviation are 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that 
after controlling for other factors both increased over 
the time period under investigation. 
 
  
 DARK NETWORK RESILIENCE IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT 11 
Criminology, Criminal Justice, Law & Society – Volume 16, Issue 1 





















12 EVERTON AND CUNNINGHAM 
Criminology, Criminal Justice, Law & Society – Volume 16, Issue 1 






The E-I Index (Figure 6) shows that the 
combined network became increasingly inward for 
most of the period under consideration. Indeed, the 
network exhibited a pattern of establishing external 
ties prior to most of the Noordin-led attacks, 
excluding the 2005 Bali bombings. This trend likely 
reflects a need for information or other types of 
resources such as bomb-making materials and 
money. On the other hand, the network also turned 
increasingly inward, again with the exception of the 
2005 attacks, following the Noordin-led attacks. 
These changes prior to and after the majority of the 
attacks highlight that network cohesion is likely to 
change immediately before and after an attack. What 
is especially interesting is how just before the July 
2009 attacks, Noordin began forming ties to actors 
outside of his immediate circle because it raises the 
possibility that Noordin may have been careless in 
forming these ties, which may have contributed to his 
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Table 1 displays the results of our multivariate 
regression analysis. The tables contain models with 
and without the month and month squared variables 
due to high collinearity between the two time 
variables. Because our table contains five dependent 
variables for both sets of models, along with ten 
independent variables for the models with the month 
and month squared variables and eight independent 
variables for those without, it is impossible to discuss 
all of the nearly 100 coefficients. Thus, our 
comments will tend to focus on the models without 
the two month variables and we will concentrate on 
overall patterns and focus on those coefficients that 
are both substantively and statistically significant 
(McCloskey, 1995; Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008). The 
table presents many interesting findings. For 
example, the adjusted R2 for all of the models are 
extremely high and indicate that they account for a 
substantial amount of the variation in the dependent 
variables, as well as provide a sense of confidence 
that our models adequately explain the variability in 
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Looking at the pre-operational and the post-
operational behavior of the network, the network did 
become increasingly centralized prior to an attack in 
terms of the degree centralization measures but not in 
terms of the betweenness centralization measures, 
lending some support for hypothesis 1a. Given that 
the former measures capture the extent to which a 
network is centered around actors who possess 
numerous ties, while latter measures capture the 
extent to which it is centered around actors who are 
in positions of brokerage, this result suggests 
centralization occurs on some dimensions prior to an 
attack but not on others. Interestingly, the network 
did not decentralize like we predicted it would after 
attacks (Hypothesis 1b).10 In fact, it appears to have 
continued to centralize in the aftermath of its attacks. 
This may indicate that Noordin was incapable of 
adopting a less centralized and flexible structure 
immediately after an attack, which probably left his 
network vulnerable during those periods. 
Interestingly, the network did drift toward the 
external side of the E-I spectrum before attacks, 
which lends support Hypothesis 2a. His network 
followed the same behavior after attacks as well 
(Hypotheses 2b), which may have contributed to him 
being killed. Interestingly, the Post Bali I coefficient 
shows a similar result. That the Bali I network was 
essentially destroyed in the aftermath of the attack 
suggests that increasing external ties in a hostile 
environment could lead to disastrous results. An 
alternative explanation is that the apparent inability 
for Noordin to decentralize his network or halt the 
drift toward more external ties simply reflects an 
artifact of the way our data are coded. As noted 
above, we assumed that a tie continued to exist once 
it was formed, which means that we may not have 
captured whether some ties were severed (or at least 
went dormant) after an attack. 
As predicted (Hypotheses 3a and 3b) it appears 
that both Det 88 and the JCLEC caused Noordin’s 
network to become increasingly isolated as indicated 
by the E-I Index column in Table 1. The results 
indicate that they contributed to the network’s inward 
looking behavior, which suggests that the network 
felt the pressure being exerted by the two groups and 
consequently attempted to increase its security by 
focusing on establishing and maintaining internal ties 
while limiting external ones. While isolating an 
insurgency is generally a counterinsurgency goal, it 
can also lead to an increase in a group’s radicalism 
(Sunstein, 2009). However, in this case, it appears 
that Noordin and his followers were already highly 
radicalized (Griswold, 2010).   
The two groups appear to have affected the 
network’s centralization in different ways, however. 
Det 88 seems to have pushed it to become 
increasingly centralized, thereby increasing 
Noordin’s command and control. However, by 
causing it to become more centralized, it led it to 
become more and more vulnerable to decapitation-
like strategies, which, as we already noted, is exactly 
what befell Noordin’s network. After Noordin and a 
few of his key associates were killed in the Fall of 
2009, the network essentially fell apart. The JCLEC’s 
effect on the network’s centralization is less clear. If 
we focus only on the models that do not include the 
two time variables, then it appears that the JCLEC’s 
efforts caused the network to become less 
centralized. This suggests that the JCLEC not only 
caused Noordin to attempt to limit his personal ties in 
order to reduce visibility but also to limit his role as a 
broker in order to create a relatively more flexible 
structure in terms of the brokerage of resources. 
Thus, the JCLEC may have helped to reduce 
Noordin’s command and control capabilities, but at 
the same time, it may have allowed the network to 
adopt a more flexible structure. The fact that the sign 
of the JCLEC coefficient flips in terms of the 
betweenness centralization measures when the time 
variables are included in the models raises the 
possibility that while the pressure brought to bear by 
the JCLEC did lead Noordin to reduce his visibility, 
it did not lead him to relinquish his position of 
brokerage. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This article has explored the topic of dark 
network resilience by simultaneously considering the 
strategic tradeoffs that both dark networks and 
counter-insurgents face. It demonstrates that both sets 
of tradeoffs help shape a dark network’s structure, 
which in part affects its resiliency. As it was shown, a 
dark network’s adoption of a network structure is far 
more complex than what current literature suggests, 
namely that a network structure at either side of the 
cohesion and centralization continuums offers 
potential advantages and disadvantages in terms of 
network resilience. In the case of Noordin Top, it 
appears that his network’s focus on establishing 
external ties after its operations provided it possible 
access to resources but likely became a factor 
contributing to its exposure and eventual disruption. 
The network, much like its Bali I predecessors who 
also focused on establishing external ties after their 
operation, faced significant losses and needed to 
reconstitute itself immediately following each 
operation. This tendency, along with the general 
adoption of a centralized structure, suggests that 
Noordin’s network adopted a suboptimal structure 
that ultimately contributed to his demise.  
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Similarly, the two somewhat contrasting 
strategic approaches (Det 88 and JCLEC) both appear 
to have played critical roles in disrupting the network 
by isolating it from the population. Together, these 
approaches appear to have placed significant pressure 
on the network by forcing it to turn inward only until 
it exposed itself when it needed resources and may 
have contributed to the network’s downfall. At the 
same time, they potentially provided some short-term 
advantages for the network. The JCLEC, for 
example, appears to have reduced Noordin’s 
command and control by making it less centralized; 
however, it may have improved the network’s 
resiliency by possibly making it more difficult to 
monitor. Certainly, it is unlikely that the effect of 
these strategies will be uniform across the various 
Noordin network aggregations. For example, 
Noordin’s communication network adopted a very 
different structure than the combined network and the 
effects of our independent variables on each 
aggregation (trust, operations, business and finance, 
etc.) are unclear at this point. Only after further 
analysis can we tease out how these strategies 
affected each network. 
Clearly, more work is needed with regards to the 
security-efficiency tradeoff in terms of dark network 
resilience. One limitation of this analysis was the 
inability to tease out specific policies and sub-
strategies employed by Det 88 and the JCLEC 
against Noordin’s network. For instance, it is highly 
likely that Det 88 used alternative strategies against 
its targets, such as PSYOPs, but open-source data are 
limited in this regard. Future studies should continue 
to test various strategic options employed against 
dark networks and how they affect a network’s 
structure over time. An examination of these 
strategies to various network aggregations, much like 
the descriptive analysis in this paper, will certainly 
benefit the field. A second challenge facing this 
study, which is one many longitudinal studies of dark 
networks face, is it did not fully account for the 
endogenous effects and other internal processes that 
shaped Noordin’s network over time. For example, it 
is highly possible that some of the network’s trends 
toward internal density and greater centralization 
across time were due to Noordin’s personality and 
decision-making processes. Finally, one should not 
assume that the behavior of the Noordin Top terrorist 
network characterizes the behavior of all terrorist 
networks, let alone all dark networks. The results 
here simply suggest that it is desirable to see further 
inquiry into the security-efficiency tradeoff regarding 
network resilience within other contexts and that 
future studies should consider both the counter-
insurgent and the dark network’s strategic point of 
view. Not only would these studies help researchers 
better understand dark network resilience, but they 
would also aid in the monitoring, disruption, and 
destabilization of dark networks.  
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1  Other examples of successful centralized covert networks include Pablo Escobar’s drug trafficking network and 
Peru’s Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path).   
2  One notable exception is Koschade’s (2006) analysis of the first Bali Bombing network. 
3  Fa’i is a method used by many groups to obtain money and resources from armed robberies 
4  A tactic that was unsuccessfully attempted by the 2010 Dulmatin-led group in Aceh (International Crisis Group, 
2010). 
5  A one-mode network consists of a single set of actors and the relationships between them, which can be any 
type of ties, such as kinship, friendship, etc.  
6  Two-mode networks either consist of two sets of different actors, such as people and businesses, or one set of 
actors and one set of events or affiliations. 
7  The business and finance network is so sparse that it makes little sense to analyze it separately. 
8  We could have analyzed these networks separately in the multivariate regression section, but the purpose of this 
analysis is to examine the overall behavior of the Noordin Top terrorist network in terms of network resiliency. 
The analysis of each sub-network would certainly provide insight into intricacies of the network’s resilience, 
however.  
9  We used a variety of regression diagnostic plots (e.g., residual vs. fitted plots, proportional leverage plots, 
leverage vs. squared residual plots) to identify potentially influential cases that if removed substantially changed 
our regression results. For each model, we then estimated a regression equation that included all cases and one 
that removed potentially influential cases. Then, using the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian 
information criterion (BIC) measures of fit, we compared the models to one another. The results from the 
models having the best fit are presented in Table 1. 
10 Figures 2 through 5 appear to indicate that this does not hold for the operations network. 
